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LOCAL REAPPORTIONMENT: THE EXEMPTION
OF WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICTS
Philip L. Martin*
INTRODUCTION
In 1962 a new era dawned in American constitutional law
when the Supreme Court renounced its longstanding practice of
classifying issues concerning legislative representation as political
questions subject to the doctrine of judicial self-restraint.1 Once
the decision was made to give the courts jurisdiction over matters
of reapportionment the next step was to determine which govern-
mental entities were affected by this ruling and to devise a form-
ula for equitably allocating district representation in legislative
bodies. The first solutions to these problems were announced
two years later when it was declared that the national House of
Representatives 2 and state legislatures 3 must be apportioned ac-
cording to the "one man, one vote" principle.
Defining this guideline in the case of Reynolds v. Sims, the
Supreme Court declared that in accord with the Constitution a
state must "make an honest and good faith effort to construct
districts in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal popu-
lation as is practicable."4 Flexibility was not ruled out, however,
because it was recognized that arranging a perfect balance in pop-
ulation among legislative districts was neither feasible nor required
by the Constitution. Although the basis for achieving equality
in national and state legislatures was established by the Reynolds
standard, its application to local government remained uncertain
for several more years.
When the first local reapportionment cases came before the
Supreme Court in 1967, 5 the results were disappointing because
* Professor of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University. B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1956;
M.S. 1959, Ph.D., 1965, University of North Carolina.
1. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 534 (1964).
4. Id. at 577.
5. For a detailed analysis of the local reapportionment cases decided from
1967-1970, see Martin, The-Supreme Court and Local Reapportionment: The
Third Phase, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 102 (1970).
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the matter of inclusion under the aegis of Reynolds was left unan-
swered. All that the Court decided was to exempt appointed ad-
ministrative boards from the equality theorem" and to approve
an electoral scheme combining a district residence requirement
with an at-large election for a city council.' A ruling made in
the following year went farther when it was concluded in the case
of Avery v. Midland County that "units with general governmental
powers over an entire geographic area [must] not be apportioned
among single-member districts of substantially unequal popula-
tion."' Thus, the mandate of "one man, one vote" was extended
to cities, counties and towns, but the question of whether a locally
elected administrative board or commission is subject to the same
standard was postponed. It was noted, however, that a special
purpose government unit could conceivably have different impacts
on definable groups among its constituents.9 In the event this situa-
tion should exist, it was implied that those constituents who were
most affected by the unit's performance of its functions might
be entitled to influence commensurate with their greater interest
in the operation of the special district.
Two years later this proposition was partially answered as
local governments of special powers were included under the Rey-
nolds concept in the decision of Hadley v. Junior College Dis-
trict.1" In this case the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the
issue of the applicability of the Reynolds doctrine by announcing
a general formula pertaining to all elective governing bodies in
the United States. The Court required that regardless of what
kind of government is involved, when its legislature is elected by
districts, all voters are constitutionally guaranteed a vote of equal
value." In other words an equal number of representatives will
be elected from districts of proportionately equal population, and
there will be no legal barriers against equal participation by all
voters. This was not, however, an unqualified rule, as several
exceptions were specified.
An imposing influence on the formulation of the caveats in
the Hadley decision was undoubtedly the cogent dissent registered
by Justice Harlan. He contended that special governments should
be treated separately because the basis for their creation is to pro-
vide a specialized function which is conditioned by the particular
needs of a locality.' 2 Moreover, it was emphasized that units,
6. Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
7. Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967).
8. 390 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1968).
9. Id. at 483-84.
10. 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970).
11. Id. at 56.
12. Id. at 60-61 (dissenting opinion).
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from air pollution control agencies to irrigation districts to school
districts, have different impacts on the various citizens whom they
serve. These differing impacts are reflected in diverse patterns
of representation on the governing boards and in dual policies
of taxation. In some areas of the nation the traditional axiom
equating representation with taxation has been officially adopted
with the result that those people who receive the greatest benefit
from a special government pay more taxes and, accordingly, are
given more representation or voting power than other residents.
The Hadley majority rejected a rule which would have allowed
a local governmental unit possessed with general powers to be
apportioned in accord with its impact upon various constituen-
cies.'" Nevertheless, consideration of such impact has been incor-
porated into equal apportionment exemptions whose importance
has been demonstrated in two recent cases in California and Wyo-
ming, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District4 and Associated
Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement District.'5
The controversies in these cases center on the same consider-
ations noted in Justice Harlan's dissent in Hadley. In each in-
stance the concern is with the constitutionality of allocating politi-
cal power on the basis of economic wealth inasmuch as the impact
of what the government does varies according to how much acre-
age or land value is owned. This electoral scheme, of course,
results in some citizens being denied the right to vote, while others
who are franchised cast a ballot of less weight than wealthier vot-
ers. In both the Salyer and Toltec cases the Supreme Court was
confronted with the problem of determining whether the most im-
portant aspect of the political process in special districts is guar-
anteeing voting equity to all citizens or preserving the means by
which the unit is financed and governed since some citizens have
a greater stake in its performance and policies due to their larger
economic interests.
LAND VALUE AND VOTING POWER
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Storage District
One of the possibilities recognized by the Hadley court is
that "there might be some case in which a State elected certain
functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal gov-
ernmental activities and so disproportionately affect different
groups that a popular election in compliance with Reynolds...
13. Id. at 54-55.
14. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
15. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist.,
410 U.S. 743 (1973).
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might not be required. . .... -1 Since the Hadley case concerned
the election of school district trustees, this form of special govern-
ment was eliminated as one of the aforementioned possibilities
because "[e]ducation has traditionally been a vital governmental
function, and these trustees, whose election the State has opened
to all qualified voters, are governmental officials in every relevant
sense of that term."'17 Aside from this conclusion no other clarifi-
cation was given for the preceding caveat as the Supreme Court
evidently preferred to use the case-by-case approach in ruling
on this question.
Prior to the Salyer case the only application of the "dispro-
portionate affect" provision was made to the election of judges by
districts. Using this standard, along with the belief that appor-
tionment applies only to legislatures, a three-judge federal court
ruled that the Louisiana Supreme Court, which is elected from
districts of varying populations, is exempt from the "one man,
one vote" requirement.' 8  In a memorandum decision issued on
January 8, 1973 the Supreme Court upheld that lower court's
decision, while three justices dissented on the grounds that the
Hadley qualification did not include the judiciary footnote. How-
ever, they did not specify what kinds of governmental arrangements
would be affected. Two months later the Supreme Court again
considered this issue in a case concerning a water storage district
authorized by the State of California.'
The particular governmental unit involved in this adjudica-
tion contains 193,000 acres of intensively cultivated, highly fertile
farm land in the Tulare Lake Basin. Because of perennial dif-
ficulties, this kind of special district is empowered to plan and
implement projects "for the acquisition, appropriation, diversion,
storage, conservation, and distribution of water. ... o Prob-
lems such as these are typical in the western states where the coin-
cidence of melting mountain snows and the spring rainy season
create hazardous flood conditions and the hot, dry summer results
in drought before the fall rainy season. In the case of the Tulare
Water Storage District, the functions are strictly the acquisition,
storage and distribution of water for farming.
These functions are administered by a board of directors who
are chosen in odd-numbered years in elections in which only agri-
cultural landowners can vote, regardless of where they live.2' Al-
16. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
17. Id.
18. Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972).
19. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
20. CAL. WATER CODE § 42200 et seq. (West 1966), as amended, CAL. WATER
CODE § 42200 et seq. (West Supp. 1973).
21. Id. § 41001.
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though the Tulare District is divided into ten precincts, "[elach
voter may vote in each precinct in which any of the land owned
by him is situated and may cast one vote for each one hundred
dollars ($100), or fraction thereof, worth of his land, exclusive
of improvements, minerals, and mineral rights therein, in the pre-
cinct." 2  Consequently, the lessees of farmlands23 and the resi-
dents of the districts who do not own any agricultural land are
disenfranchised, and most of the district's 77 residents are in this
category.
Since few of the residents can vote, who are the participants
in the district political process? The major ones are four corpora-
tions: The Salyer Land Company, South Lake Farms, West Lake
Farms, and the J. G. Boswell Company. Together they own 85
percent of the land in the district. The appellees in Salyer noted
that the J. G. Boswell Co. owns 61,665.54 acres, with an assessed
valuation of $3,782,220, which results in Boswell exercising
37,825 votes. As a result, the Boswell Company can win any
board election, and, not surprisingly, the last one was held in 1947
because the outcome is a foregone conclusion.24
Assailing the scheme by which one corporation is permitted
to exercise so much control, the plaintiff contended that limiting
the vote to district landowners violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment inasmuch as nonlandowning resi-
dents have as much interest in the decisions and policies of the
district government as the landowners who may or may not be
residents. It was argued that both parties would have equal con-
cern in operations relating to flood control, in that the homes of
nonlandowning residents may be damaged by floods, and floods
may result in loss of employment. An example of how interests
can conflict occurred in 1969 when 88,000 of the 193,000 acres
in the Tulare Lake Basin were inundated. Prior to this episode
flood waters were stored in the Buena Vista Lake to the south
of the Tulare Basin. In 1969, the Tulare Board of Directors,
dominated by the Boswell Company, voted 6-4 to table a motion
that would have continued this alternative means of flood con-
trol.215 According to the dissenters in the Salyer case, the reason
behind the board's action was that the "J. G. Boswell Co. had
a long term agricultural lease in the Buena Vista Lake Basin and
flooding it would have interfered with the planting, growing, and
22. Id.
23. Since the franchise may be exercised by proxy, a lessee may negotiate to
have votes included in his lease. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 41002, 41005 (West
1966), as amended, CAL. WATER CODE § 41002 (West Supp. 1973).
24. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 735 (1973)
(dissenting opinion).
25. Id. at 737.
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harvesting of crops the next season."' 28  Therefore, the decision
was made to subject the land of others to menacing flood danger,
contrary to the policy which had been used successfully over the
years.
In challenging Section 41001 of the California Water Code
27
which limits the vote in a water district to landowners, the plain-
tiff relied upon previous Supreme Court rulings against allegedly
similar restrictions of the franchise. On this question it has been
decided that a state cannot limit the vote in school district elec-
tions to owners and lessees of real property and parents of school
children when there is no state interest to be served by the exclu-
sion of otherwise qualified voters.2 8  This ruling was extended
to referenda for the approval of revenue bonds to finance local
improvements on the grounds that the decision to issue bonds
was made by officials who were elected by all the people. 29  The
restriction against non-property owners participating in revenue
bond elections was held by the Court to be a violation of the
equal protection clause since all voters are substantially affected
by the issuance of bonds to finance municipal utilities."0 For
the same reason the Supreme Court also included general obliga-
tion bonds under the following rule:
Presumptively, when all citizens are affected in impor-
tant ways by a governmental decision subject to a referen-
dum, the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the
exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise. 3 1
The point emphasized by these cases is that the Supreme Court
seems to regard the concept of the restricted electorate as being
inherently unconstitutional in most instances because it always
poses the "danger of denying some citizens any effective voice
in the governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives."
32
Acceptance of a restrictive electoral plan seems to be possible only
if there is a compelling governmental goal or interest which can
be best attained by limiting the franchise. Using this interpreta-
tion the plaintiff alleged that the Tulare Water District did not
meet the constitutional test inasmuch as neither the administration
nor viability of a state policy was dependent upon the unit's opera-
tions.
In evaluating the California statutory scheme the Supreme
Court first had to define what kind of governmental powers are
26. Id.
27. CAL. WATER CODE § 41001 (West 1966).
28. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
29. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
30. Id. at 705.
31. Phoenix v. Kolodjiezski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970).
32. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
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exercised by the Tulare Water District. If the district is one of
general powers, then the "one person, one vote"33 principle would
apply. On the other hand, if the district performs only special
functions, it could be subject to Hadley's disproportionate affect
exemption from the Reynolds standard of equal representation.34
Under provisions of the California Water Code a water storage
district has some powers normally exercised by governments of
general authority. These include: (1) maintaining a staff of pro-
fessional employees;3 5 (2) contracting for the construction of
projects; 6 (3) condemning private property for district use;17 (4)
cooperating with federal and state agencies;38 and (5) incurring
indebtedness through issuance of bonds.3 a However, the Supreme
Court emphasized that the Tulare District does not provide other
types of traditional governmental services such as schools, roads,
housing, utilities, police and fire protection or transportation, nor
are there any towns or subdivisions to administer these functions
within the district. The fact that it does engage in flood control,
a governmental activity, was considered by the Court as incidental
to the "exercise of the district's primary functions of water storage
and distribution."40  Therefore, the Tulare District was classified
as being a government of special powers because it does not per-
form what are regarded as "normal governmental" duties and
functions.
After establishing the character of the water storage district,
it next was necessary to determine if the Hadley caveat recogniz-
ing disproportionate affect would apply in this case. The key
factor in this analysis was considered to be the fiscal powers of
government. The Supreme Court found that the financial bur-
dens of the district are distributed in the same manner as the
right to vote. All project costs are assessed against landowners
according to the benefit received, and likewise, the charges for
services performed are levied in proportion to the benefit derived
by the landowner, and whenever nonpayment occurs, these provi-
sions are enforced by placing a lien on the land.4 To illustrate
how this system works, reference was made to the latest district
project which had a capital cost of almost $2,500,000. This ex-
pense required an assessment of $13.26 per acre. Consequently,
33. Presumably, in deference to the equal rights movement for women, the
Supreme Court has modified the Reynolds principle to "one person, one vote."
34. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
35. CAL. WATER CODE § 43152 (West 1966).
36. Id.
37. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 43530-43533 (West 1966).
38. Id. § 43151.
39. Id. § 44900.
40. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 728 n.8
(1973).
41. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 47183, 46280 (West 1966).
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the total amount collected from 3 landowners, each of whom is
entitled by valuation to one vote, was $46. In contrast, the Bos-
well Co., which has 37,825 votes, paid $817,685.42
In assessing the rationale behind the California policy, the
Supreme Court assumed that it was enacted in order to facilitate
the organization of water storage districts, reasoning that unless
they had a dominant voice in the district's operations the landown-
ers would never have agreed to its organization.4 Allegedly, any
alternative permitting full participation in district governance
would not have been feasible. This interpretation was defended
on the grounds that:
Since the subjection of the owners' lands to ...[assess-
ments] was the basis by which the district was to obtain fi-
nancing, the proposed district had as a practical matter to
attract landowner support. Nor, since assessments against
landowners were to be the sole means by which the expenses
of the district were to be paid, could it be said to be unfair or
inequitable to repose the franchise in landowners but not
residents. Landowners as a class were to bear the entire bur-
den of the district's costs, and the State could rationally con-
clude that they to the exclusion of residents should be charged
with responsibility for its operations. 44
Therefore, the Hadley caveat was ruled applicable to the Califor-
nia water storage districts because they are special units of govern-
ment whose functions have a disproportionate affect upon differ-
ent groups within their jurisdiction. As a result, voting equality
in accordance with the Reynolds standard is not required for such
governments.45
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist averred that the
California system was also constitutionally justifiable because it
provided a sufficient safeguard for minority interests in its project
decision making process. After a district proposes a project, it
must first be approved by the California Department of Water
Resources. 46  Next, a report detailing the estimated cost of the
project must be submitted to the state treasurer who conducts an
independent investigation for the purpose of approving or reject-
42. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 734 (1973).
43. According to municipal law, a special district generally is not created
arbitrarily by a state but, rather, it is established at the request and/or consent
of voters. This point is involved in Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Water-
shed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973). See notes 60-67 infra.
44. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 731 (1973).
45. The complaint against lessee disfranchisement was also dismissed since
it was not an absolute restriction. See note 23 supra.
46. CAL. WATER CODE § 42200 et seq. (West 1966), as amended, (West Supp.
1973).
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ing the report.4 7  If the proposal is accepted, a special election
is then held in the district,48 and adoption of a project requires
approval by a majority of the total votes assigned to the landown-
ers and by a majority of the eligible voters.4" This requirement
of ratification by two majorities was viewed as being especially
protective against decisions favorable to the large landowner since
in the previously mentioned district project involving the assess-
ment of $13.26 per acre, the project had to be approved by not
only a majority of the total votes but also by a majority of the
landowners. At that time approximately 190 landowners consti-
tuted a majority, and 190 of the smallest landowners in the district
controlled only 2.34 per cent of the land. Thus, the Court em-
phasized that projects could be defeated in this scheme of dual
voting by voters who own only a small fraction of the districts
acreage.50 Although the minority interest can be protected in
project decision making by the dual vote requirement, the Salyer
majority failed to take cognizance of how the governing board
dominated by a single large landowner can render decisions as
to storage of flood waters detrimental to other properties in the
district.
It was basically on this issue that three members of the Su-
preme Court dissented in the Salyer case. In their opinion the
water storage district performs important governmental functions
which have a significant impact throughout the district. In addi-
tion to the functions enumerated by the majority opinion' and
that of flood control, which the three dissenters regarded as more
than an incidental function, it was pointed out that this unit of
government also has governmental immunity from suit,52 its works
are exempt from taxation,5 3 and it has the power of eminent do-
main.54 In short the same authority and rights possessed by other
units of local government are accorded to water storage districts.
It was contended, therefore, that the Avery "one man, one vote"
principle regarding general purpose governments,55 not the Hadley
caveat,56 should apply in this instance.
Still another objection was raised against the California pol-
icy. The dissent considered it "grotesque to think of corporations
47. Id. § 42275 et seq.
48. Id. § 42301(b).
49. Id. § 42550.
50. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 723 n.3
(1973).
51. See notes 36-39 supra.
52. CAL. Gov'T CODE H§ 811.2, 815 (West 1966).
53. CAL. WATER CODE § 43508 (West 1966).
54. Id. § 43530.
55. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1968).
56. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
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voting within the framework of political representation of peo-
ple." 57  The fact that one corporation can outvote 77 people in
the Tulare District was asserted to be contrary to anything
dreamed of by the Founding Fathers in 1787. Yet, the dissenters
ignored the manner in which assessments are levied for financing
projects and the implication of such financing. Presumably, they
would not accept any reconciliation of representation and taxation
in a special purpose government.
ACREAGE OWNERSHIP AND WEIGHTED VOTING
Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Watershed Improvement District
The Hadley case not only recognized an exception to the
Reynolds principle arising from a government's disproportionate
affect upon different groups but it also mentioned the possibility
that "a State may, in certain cases, limit the right to vote to a
particular group or class of people."" s At the time of the Hadley
decision it was anticipated that among the elections entitled to
exemption under the second caveat would be those held for the
creation of a new governmental unit such as a special district.
In most, if not all, states these subdivisions must be approved
by a referendum by the voters who live within the proposed juris-
diction.59 Moreover, when the services of this kind of government
are financed by a special levy upon a particular group, the fran-
chise generally has been limited to those voters.60 This is the
policy prescribed by Wyoming for establishing watershed improve-
ment districts. Thus, the challenge against this procedure paral-
lels the one rejected in the Salyer case in that the district electorate
consists solely of property owners whose votes are weighted ac-
cording to acreage.
To initiate the creation of a watershed improvement district,
a majority of the affected landowners file a petition specifying
the need and size of the proposed unit.6 ' Since the new govern-
ment will operate as a subdivision within the boundaries of an
established soil and water conservation district, the petition is sub-
mitted to that district's board of supervisors who are required to
call a public hearing at which "[a]ll owners of land within the
57. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 741 (1973).
58. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 58-59 (1970).
59. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 9-15
(1957).
60. The origin and use of this restriction is described in SCOTT AND BOLLENS,
SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT 3-4 (1949).
61. Watershed Improvement District Act, WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-354.5
(1973).
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proposed watershed improvement district and all other interested
parties shall have the right to attend . . . and to be heard."62
After reviewing the evidence and testimony presented at the public
hearing, the board of supervisors decides if a watershed district
is needed or if the petition should be denied.6 1 If convinced that
there is a need for this unit, the board must then ascertain whether
the proposal is "administratively practicable and feasible."64  In
reaching this conclusion, a referendum must be held within the
boundaries of the proposed district and only the landowners of
the affected area are allowed to vote.65 If a majority of these
landowners, representing a majority of the acreage within the pro-
posed district, approve the plan, then the board of supervisors
can decide that the new government is administratively practicable
and feasible and declare it to be created. 66
The Wyoming controversy began in 1970 when the Toltec
Watershed Improvement District, established by the referendum
procedure outlined above, sought entry onto lands owned by Asso-
ciated Enterprises, Inc. Associated denied the right of entry on
the ground that the Wyoming procedure for creating watershed
districts violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because the referendum is only open to landowners
and the votes are weighted according to the amount of acreage
owned.
In a per curiam decision the Supreme Court by a vote of
6 to 3 upheld the Wyoming statute. Relying primarily on its rea-
soning in the Salyer case, the Court emphasized the applicability
of the Hadley caveats to the watershed government.67 In addi-
tion, the majority noted that the entire process for establishing
this subdivision of the soil and water conservation district is man-
aged by the latter's board of supervisors who are popularly elected
by both occupiers and owners of land within the (primary) dis-
trict.68 Furthermore, it was pointed out that "a precondition to
their formation referendum is a determination by a board of super-
visors of the affected conservation district . . . that the watershed
improvement district is both necessary and administratively prac-
ticable." 69  In the same manner that dual voting was regarded
62. Id. § 41-354.7(A).
63. Id. § 41-354.7(C).
64. Id. § 41-354.8.
65. Id. § 41-354.9(B).
66. Id. § 41-354.10.
67. See generally BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 9-15 (1957).
68. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410
U.S. 743, 744-45 (1973).
69. Id.
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as an equal rights guarantee in the Salyer case,' 0 the Supreme
Court appeared to consider the participation of the board of
supervisors of the soil and water conservation district as a protec-
tion against arbitrariness or minority control and favoritism.
The dissenters particularly disagreed with this last point in
the Toltec case because, unlike California, 71 Wyoming does not
provide for the transfer of votes by a property owner to a lessee.
Writing again for the minority, Justice Douglas thought that this
omission was anomalous inasmuch as the Watershed Improvement
District Act recognizes the nonlandowners' interest in the pro-
posed creation of this unit by specifying their right to attend and
be heard at the public hearing held before the formation refer-
endum.72 No reason was given for extending to the nonproperty
owner the right to a public hearing while excluding him from
expressing his opinions through a ballot, and thus the dissenters
speculated that land management in Wyoming was vested in the
"wealthy few."' 71 Such a policy, it was contended, is contrary
to Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny which hold that "important
governmental functions may not be assigned to special groups,
whether powerful lobbies or other discrete groups to which a state
legislator is often beholden."' 4
To support this point, the categorization of the subdistrict
by the majority was attacked as erroneous because the dissenters
believed that a watershed district does perform "important govern-
mental functions" in that it may: levy and collect special assess-
ments;75 acquire and dispose of property; 76 exercise the power
of eminent domain; 77 borrow money and issue bonds; 78 and pro-
vide plans for flood control. 79  Consequently, there was a reitera-
tion of the Salyer dissent in that the Avery principle80 and not
the Hadley caveats8 ' were deemed controlling in regard to water-
shed improvement districts."2
In discussing the concept of "important governmental func-
70. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 723 n.3
(1973).
71. See note 23 supra.
72. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist.,
410 U.S. 743, 745-46 n.1 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
73. Id. at 746.
74. Id. at 751 (dissenting opinion).
75. Watershed Improvement Act, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-354.13(A) (1973).
76. Id. § 41-354.13(B).
77. Id. § 41-354.13(C).
78. Id. § 41-354.13(E).
79. Id. § 41-354.2.
80. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1968).
81. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 58-59 (1970).
82. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410
U.S. 743, 748-49 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
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tions" an effort was made to provide more currency for this argu-
ment by the addition of an environmental argument which had
not received attention in the Salyer case. In this respect the dis-
sent stated that while serving its electorate (the landowners) the
district could abuse the public interest in the following way:
. . . its power to reshape or control the watershed and to
provide flood control enables it to turn rivers into flumes or
to destroy them by erecting dams to build reservoirs. Dams
may be vital or they may be disastrous. . . . Dams substi-
tute a reservoir for a river and wipe out the varied life of
a river course, including its wildlife, canoe waters, camping
and picnic grounds, and nesting areas of birds. This re-
shaping of the face of the Nation may be disastrous, no mat-
ter who casts the ballots. The enormity of the violation of
our environmental ethics, represented by state and federal
laws, is only increased when the ballot is restricted to or
heavily weighted on behalf of the few who are important
only because they are wealthy.83
Responding to this charge, the Toltec majority rejected the notion
of a predominant public interest by noting that "[t]he statute
authorizing the establishment of improvement districts was en-
acted by a legislature in which all of the State's electors have the
unquestioned right to be fairly represented." 84
CONCLUSION
After comparing the California and Wyoming cases, it is ap-
parent that the crux of the controversy is the degree to which
the presumptively eligible public-all those who reside in the con-
templated district-can be allowed to participate in elections hav-
ing at least some indirect effect upon them while maintaining a
prerogative for the traditional concept of property rights. A ma-
jority of the current Supreme Court obviously desires to continue
enforcing the principle of balancing representation with taxation
as long as the public interest is procedurally protected. In the
Salyer ruling the requirement of dual voting was accepted as pro-
viding due process of law for all concerned parties.8 5 In the Tol-
tec decision the Supreme Court's majority interpreted the law as
meaning that the board of supervisors of the soil and water conser-
vation district could refuse to call for the formation referendum
if, in their opinion, the proposed watershed district is not "admin-
istratively necessary and practicable."8 6
83. Id.
84. Id. at 744-45.
85. See notes 36-39 supra.
86. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist.,
410 U.S. 743, 745 (1973).
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Although they did not discuss the issue of procedural safe-
guards in the Salyer case, the dissenters disagreed with the ma-
jority's interpretation of the Wyoming policy in the Toltec deci-
sion. In the view of Justice Douglas and his colleagues the law
requires that after a petition had been properly filed, "a referen-
dum must be held in the proposed district" regardless of the
board's evaluation of administrative feasibility. 7 Therefore, the
Court's minority contended that there was no procedural safe-
guard to protect the public interest. Unfortunately, the Wyoming
law does not seem to provide any clarification on this question.
Conflicting alternative statutory meanings such as the one
in the preceding paragraph complicate the adjudication of local
government reapportionment. In fact the Supreme Court has
found the problems of local representation far more difficult to
resolve than those it has encountered at the federal and state levels.
It has even been argued that this entire level of government in-
volves such complex policy interests that it should thereby be ex-
cluded from reapportionment requirements.8 8 Justice Fortas, dis-
senting in Avery v. Midland County,"9 endorsed the Reynolds con-
cept as a guideline for calculating representation in the national
House of Representatives and in state legislatures, but he doubted
its feasibility for districting a state's subdivisions. The basis for
his distinction was that the actions of a state legislature similarly
affect the people of a state. In contrast, Justice Fortas empha-
sized that the functions of county government generally do not
have the same impact on all constituents. If the impact is equal,
then, he asserted that the "one man, one vote" principle would
be applicable. 90
No matter what the level of government, one authority has
perceived that the "real issue posed by the reapportionment revo-
lution is the equalization of citizen influence on legislative out-
comes. ... "' This, of course, is particularly true at the local
level where patterns of representation are varied. Why has local
government developed different systems of representation? Part,
if not all, of the answer can be found in historical necessity. For
example, over seventy-five years ago the Supreme Court recog-
nized the unique situation of western states in dealing with the
problems of water distribution. Thus, it upheld a California law
which provided for the organization and government of irrigation
87. Id. at 746 n.1.
88. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 490-91 (1968) (dissenting
opinion).
89. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
90. Id. at 499-509 (dissenting opinion).
91. Dixon, Local Representation: Constitutional Mandates and Apportion-
ment Options, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 694, 711 (1968).
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districts against claims of denial of due process under the four-
teenth amendment.12 Although many variations of local appor-
tionment have been approved in the past, the reapportionment
revolution has raised questions about representation which, in a
day of ecological concern, needs to be re-examined.
The "one person, one vote" philosophy now pervades all lev-
els of government. The Supreme Court, however, is not the
institution to answer these questions. As Justice Frankfurter
stated in his dissent in Baker v. Carr: "[e]ven assuming the in-
dispensable intellectual disinterestedness on the part of judges in
such matters, they do not have the accepted legal standards or
criteria or even reliable analogies to draw upon for making judicial
judgments.""3
Following its reconsideration of Abate v. Mundt,94 declaring
local government to be an exception to the mathematical strin-
gency of "one person, one vote,"95 Mahn v. Howell,"0 exempting
state legislative apportionment from the same rigorous require-
ment, and Galfney v. Cummings97 completing the cycle by ex-
empting congressional representation, the Supreme Court will
probably continue a "hands-off" policy for special districts such
as those involved in the Salyer and Toltec cases. Clearly, these
controversies concern citizens who are aggrieved over a decision
in which they feel they have had no part. But seminal power
for such decisions is derived from larger governmental units which
are elected by all citizens irrespective of whether or not they own
land or own it in specific quantities. It is in these general power
units of government that solutions to problems can best be worked
out through bargaining among competing political interests. One
can hope that if the political arm of government is given another
chance there will not be the legislative abnegation of responsibility
which originally resulted in the Supreme Court becoming involved
in the reapportionment process.
92. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
93. 369 U.S. 186, 268 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
94. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
95. This change in rulings is analyzed in Martin, The Constitutional Status
of Local Government Reapportionment, 6 VAL. L. REv. 237 (1972).
96. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
97. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
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